An undated email with the heading Case#497499 which appeared to have originated from District 8 (DR) to unknown recipients; Info: BT UNCLAS //N16130// Period : 200913Z Apr 10 -051521Z May 10 (04:13CDT 20 Apr-11:21CDT May 5).
inadvertently included transcripts of a post blowout SAR blueprint. Initially, the 72 itemised entries (in chronological order numbered from A to BT), was thought to be part of the event log of the actual SAR operations carried out at site. One keen investigator however, pointed out the time differences and the discrepancies in some key details.
The “5 hours 57 minutes schedule” started at 202357z (18:57 CDT) just 22 minutes after a discussion ensued about the pressure anomalies and negative-pressure test procedure. BP over-rode the suspicious results with an order to pump seawater into the kill line to confirm it was full and to pass a new negative-pressure test according to BP's criteria (see BP official log).
Extracted from BP chronological record of events.
18:35 Discussion ensued about pressure anomalies and negative-pressure test procedure. Seawater pumped into the kill line to confirm it was full. Opened kill line and bled 0.2 bbl to mini trip tank; flow stopped. Kill line opened and monitored for 30 minutes with no flow. At 19:55:00 hours, the negative-pressure test was concluded and considered a good test.
With that “pesky obstacle to the planned blowout” out of the way, the perpetrators to the crime went ahead to finalize the SAR operation that was to follow the “accident”. They wanted the blowout to appear like an accident. At the same time they needed to control and contain the chaotic aftermath. They wanted their cake and eat it as well. With a well coordinated SAR ops, they could come out of the “field crew negligent accidental disaster” smelling like roses.
Item A (CIC notification & DSC) with a time of 202357Z (18:57 CDT) eeriely translates to 21:57 CDT by adding 3 hours to 202357Z. It was also the time when the DWH master announced the activation of the EDS at 21:56 CDT (within the minute). The blowout was carefully orchestrated to occur at 21:45 CDT and the mayday distress call to follow 7 minutes later at 21:52 CDT. The first blogger (anchorman at Gcaptain.com) to announce the DWH accident posted at 22:34 (37 minutes after 21:57 CDT or 49 minutes after the blowout at 21:45 CDT).
Extracted from BP chronological record of events.
At 17:17 CDT Mud offloading from DWH mud pits to M/V Damon Bankston ceased. Mudlogger not notified.
17:27 – 17:52 CDT Drill pipe pressure reduced from 1,205 psi to 0 psi by bleeding off 15 bbls to 23 bbls of fluid to the cement unit. Rig crew and well site leader discussed negative-pressure test procedure. Well-site leader stated that the negative-pressure test needed to be done on the kill line in accordance with the BP plan submitted to MMS.
Why the obsession with timing accuracy to the minute on key controlling events and the need for coded numbers in the planned explosion? Everyone involved in any covert operation of this scale, need to know their “play” at the correct time once the count down begins. There can be no mistake. The timing can easily be confirmed by their coded numbered sequence. Delays are shifted in hours or days but the minute after the hour remained the same. Otherwise, unintended casualties from confused timing and early triggers can result in a real accident and possibly give the game away. Unlike Hollywood movies, the staged disaster can turn horribly ugly and there can be no rehearsals in the real sense.
For more examples see Kollmann's article on Natural or Accidental Disasters timed to happen.
The countdown for this disaster started at 07:00 am on April 20, 2010 once Halliburton's well experts on board DWH believed the well was unstable and ready to blow. The CBL tests would have confirmed their expert opinion. But the test results would also put a stop to the planned blowout. With millions of dollars and 126 lives at stake, any responsible company would have stopped their rush to abandon the completed well and perform the CBL tests. If the cementing and seals were defective as BP was repeatedly told, there were more reasons to perform the CBL log, if BP had any intention of reusing this well for production.
"Halliburton and BP knew weeks before the fatal explosion of the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico that the cement mixture they planned to use to seal the bottom of the well was unstable but still went ahead with the job, the presidential commission investigating the accident said on Thursday.
In the first official finding of responsibility for the blowout, which killed 11 workers and led to the largest offshore oil spill in American history, the commission staff determined that Halliburton had conducted three laboratory tests that indicated that the cement mixture did not meet industry standards.
The result of at least one of those tests was given on March 8 to BP, which failed to act upon it, the panel's lead investigator, Fred H. Bartlit Jr., said in a letter delivered to the commissioners on Thursday." - The New York Times : Firms Knew of Cement Flaws Before Spill, Panel Says
Obviously after a long night deliberation, BP's office in Houston gave their important decision early in the morning of 20 April to their company man onboard DWH. Contrary to news carried by the mainstream media, BP did not discussed the running of the cement bond log (CBL) during morning operations call (at 7:30 am) with the service providers before cancelling the CBL tests. That decision was already made by BP's HQ. BP's company man merely executed his immediate boss's order at 7:00am on April 20, 30 minutes before the morning operations call.
On closer inspection, the itemized scripts unmistakeably described actions to be taken after the explosion had engulfed the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) in flames. The actual SAR ops carried out in the aftermath of the “accident” followed the prepared scripts to the letter except for certain unforeseeable items. Exhibit 1 gives the complete 4 page document.
For exhibit 1: click on link below
To be continued.....